American Soft Power in Decline
The Budgetary Paradox: Ammunition over Diplomacy
“If you don’t fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition, ultimately.”
These oft-quoted words were spoken by Jim Mattis in 2013, when he was still commander of U.S. Central Command. When Donald Trump took office as president in 2017, Mattis became Secretary of Defense. Mattis’s words from 2013 stands in stark contrast to Trump’s defense and foreign policy. While the United States under Trump increased defense spending and simultaneously cut funding for the U.S. Department of State, which is responsible for the country’s foreign policy and international relations, Trump’s policy appears highly contradictory if the goal is for the U.S. both to retain its global leadership position and to reduce its expenditures.
Defining Soft Power: The Legacy of Joseph Nye
In May, the American political scientist Joseph Nye died. He coined the concept of “soft power.” By soft power, Nye referred to the ability to attract and persuade others through cultural appeal, political values, and diplomacy rather than coercion through military or economic means. The United States is a dominant great power due to its military capabilities and economic resources, but also because American culture in a broad sense has — at least historically — exerted strong international influence.
Given Trump’s desire for a swift end to the war in Ukraine, his view that the U.S. should stay out of armed conflicts, and his emphasis on the need for drastic cuts to the federal budget, it may seem somewhat paradoxical that he has advocated military rearmament. Desired objectives can often be achieved far more cost-effectively through soft power than through military means. It appears that Trump lacks an understanding of the value of soft power, and that may indeed be the case, but Trump has also had individuals such as the aforementioned Mattis in his cabinet—people who clearly understood the importance of soft power. Even if Trump has shown an inability or unwillingness to listen to competent advisers, his refusal to acknowledge the value of American soft power can hardly be explained solely by ignorance.
From Global Leadership to Transactional Realism
Trump’s foreign policy, which he branded under the name America First, has been interpreted by many as a return to traditional American isolationism, and a lack of interest in the outside world could explain the disregard for soft power. However, one can also argue that Trump’s foreign policy has not been particularly isolationist at all. Economic protectionism is not the same as political isolationism.
Trump and a large portion of his supporters dislike globalization, international organizations, and multilateral agreements — something that can be interpreted as an expression of both nationalism and American legal tradition. At the same time, Trump has been very active in pursuing bilateral agreements and exerting pressure on individual countries, primarily through tariffs. According to Nye’s definition, tariffs used as instruments of pressure are also an expression of hard power. Punitive tariffs also damage relations between countries and undermine trust in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Trump has weakened the American-led world order, often referred to as Pax Americana, while at the same time acting to prevent China from assuming the role of leading superpower.
Trump’s foreign policy has been described as “transactional.” He acts in foreign affairs as if it were a real estate market, where the goal is to strike good deals and contracts that at least in the short term benefit Americans or the electorate. In the long run, however, Trump’s policies damage American interests, especially through the loss of trust from the rest of the world.
The Culture War as Foreign Policy
Given Trump’s complete lack of understanding of diplomacy, one might assume that his general disinterest in soft power is rooted in insufficient insight. But there are other explanations. Trump’s and the Republicans’ lukewarm engagement with American soft power is also linked to the perception that contemporary American culture is largely liberal, progressive, and shaped by “wokeness.” As a result, soft power is not seen as a politically neutral instrument of national attractiveness, but rather as an ideological export apparatus working against conservative values.
Since American cultural production is generally not financed by public funds, it is difficult to control politically. An American president has little power over Hollywood, just as he has little influence over American news media. Public service broadcasters are marginal in the United States, where almost all broadcast media have long been commercial or at least private. The president cannot issue decrees or executive orders to private companies, but Trump has nonetheless attempted indirectly to combat “wokeness” within the private sector as well.
Institutional Erosion: Universities, Media, and DEI
At the very beginning of his second term, Trump issued an executive order requiring federal agencies to abandon the DEI programs introduced by the Biden administration, whose stated purpose was to promote diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility within the federal workforce. Trump’s demand to abandon DEI (Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion) also applied to federal agencies’ contractors. The abolition of DEI was justified by the claim that “foreign policy positions should be filled by the most qualified individuals, not by discriminatory quotas or ideological requirements” (see Ending Radical And Wasteful Government DEI Programs And Preferencing). However, since the requirement is directed at contractors in the form of private companies, it is itself ideological. The justification is also somewhat ironic given that Trump has not filled his own administration with particularly qualified individuals. The demand to abolish DEI programs has also been directed at non-American private companies supplying U.S. embassies. Here, the Trump administration appears to be waging a culture war beyond the borders of the United States. This is anything but isolationism — or even putting America first.
American soft power in the form of culture is thus largely independent of state or federal control. Nevertheless, culture is not apolitical. This has been evident in film, particularly in Disney’s productions. American journalism is also widely perceived as strongly left-leaning. When the Trump administration withdrew funding from, among others, the radio broadcasters Voice of America and Radio Free Asia, and ceased supporting the British BBC World Service, this was not merely a failure to understand the power of media, but also a reflection of the perception that these outlets disseminate “liberal” perspectives or narratives (see my post “Resistant Politicians”).
American universities have played an important role in the United States’ attractiveness and thus in American soft power. The Trump administration has not only cut funding to universities; it has also made it more difficult for foreign researchers and students to obtain visas. This seems unwise if one wishes to safeguard American influence, but American universities today are also dominated by Democrats and left-wing ideology.
The Twilight of Pax Americana
It is somewhat paradoxical that the United States initiated the creation of international organizations tasked with maintaining an international, treaty-based order, given that Anglo-Saxon common law is difficult to reconcile with international treaties and international law. This is one explanation for why the U.S. never joined the International Criminal Court (ICC). (Another is likely that the U.S. has had the power to remain outside.) Nevertheless, organizations such as the UN and the WTO have served American interests. Unfortunately, since China’s admission to the WTO, it appears to have systematically violated trade agreements without being punished, while gaining increased influence in the UN and the World Health Organization (WHO). At the same time, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international treaties have come to be used as tools for left-wing politics, both internationally and domestically — at least as perceived from a conservative perspective.
The Democrats and the American elite have ideologically drifted leftward, while the United States has continued to exert cultural influence through the export of ideas and ideological currents such as wokeness, BLM, intersectional feminism, and gender ideology. This cultural or ideological influence has primarily affected the educated elite in Western Europe. The Christian right, Republicans, and American conservatives have, in Europe, mainly exerted influence on supporters of smaller nationalist parties, which in many European countries have been isolated by established parties with the help of the media. This is likely a contributing factor to the Trump administration’s lack of interest in transatlantic cooperation.
The weakening of American cultural power is closely linked to the polarization of American society, which deeply divides the United States. Internal conflicts present an unattractive and contradictory image of American society and politics. Trump has contributed to strengthening polarization, but support for Trump can in turn be partly explained by the radicalization or leftward ideological drift of Democrats and the liberal elite, away from traditional American and Western values.
Even without Trump’s America First policy, American dominance — Pax Americana — would likely have been threatened due to polarization in the U.S., China’s rise, and new alliances such as BRICS. However, Trump’s policies have accelerated this development by undermining both international institutions and American soft power, as well as global trust in the United States.
This text was originally published in Swedish on U.S. Independence Day, 2025.