From Globalization to Geopolitics
For three decades, the Western world was shaped by the belief that globalization, free trade, and mutual interdependence would ensure peace. The pandemic and the war in Ukraine have, however, shown that the logic of power politics endures—even in an intertwined global economy. This development marks a shift from liberal idealism to geopolitical realism.
In this text, the concepts of liberalism, realism, realpolitik, and geopolitics are used in accordance with their fundamental meanings within theories of international relations. The purpose is not to delve into the academic distinctions between these concepts, but rather to illustrate how these ideas are reflected in the changing world order.
From Free Trade to “America First”
For a long time, political and economic thinking in the Western world was dominated by the notion that globalization, free trade, and increasing interdependence between countries would lead to economic growth and peace. In Europe, the common market and mutual economic dependence had created peace and prosperity during the Cold War, and after the fall of the Soviet Union it was assumed that the same model would work throughout Europe and even globally. One expression of this mindset was the Charter of Paris, adopted at the summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in November 1990; another was Francis Fukuyama’s thesis that history had come to an end. The continuation of Germany’s Ostpolitik can also be seen as an expression of faith in peace and stability through mutual economic interdependence.
Already during Donald Trump’s first term, this optimistic worldview began to be challenged. Through Trump’s “America First” policy and the trade war with China, it became clear that even the United States—long the principal architect and guarantor of globalization—perceived strategic risks in being overly dependent on international suppliers and rival powers. In Europe, Trump’s policies were initially dismissed as protectionism, isolationism, and populism—which they partly are — but in retrospect they can also be seen as an early expression of a more realist worldview.
The Pandemic and the War in Ukraine
The COVID-19 pandemic served as the first major wake-up call for Europe. When China initially violated World Health Organization (WHO) rules by withholding information about the spread of the virus, trust in multilateral cooperation was undermined. At the same time, the pandemic demonstrated how China’s long-standing violations of World Trade Organization (WTO) rules—state subsidies, discriminatory trade policies, and forced technology transfers—had already contributed to creating an asymmetry in which China did not seek reciprocity, but instead made others dependent on its production and raw materials. Shortages of protective equipment, medicines, and semiconductors became a shocking reminder that free trade and economic efficiency are not always compatible with strategic resilience. The pandemic thus became the first reminder that the dependencies created by globalization also entail strategic risks.
When Russia launched its full-scale war against Ukraine in February 2022, this realization became even clearer. Europe’s dependence on Russian energy—especially gas—turned into a strategic vulnerability that the Kremlin could exploit for coercion. Russia made a miscalculation when Germany supported Ukraine and stopped purchasing Russian gas, possibly partly as a result of the Nord Stream pipelines being sabotaged, but Russia would hardly have attacked Ukraine had it not assumed that dependence on Russian gas would keep Europe—and Germany in particular — out of the conflict. Like China in the industrial sphere, Russia had not sought mutual dependence but had deliberately constructed a one-sided dependency in order to use energy as a political weapon.
The Return of Geopolitics
Beyond climate policy considerations, the so-called green transition has been justified by the argument that Europe should free itself from dependence on fossil fuels from unstable or authoritarian regions. Ironically, investments in wind and solar power have made the Western world even more vulnerable and dependent on Chinese raw materials and technology. For example, in 2024 the EU imported nearly half of its rare earth elements from China and almost a third from Russia, while virtually all heavy rare earth elements used in strong magnets come from China. Militarily, China does not directly threaten anyone other than Taiwan and certain islands in the South China Sea. China does, however, use economic weapons — such as export restrictions on critical materials — to pursue national interests and challenge the United States as the leading great power. A strong China may possibly contribute to global stability, but its communist or authoritarian system means that it will never become a guarantor of a liberal world order in the same way the United States historically has been. China’s quiet but decisive support for Russia’s war effort has further demonstrated that authoritarian great powers are increasingly coordinating their actions against the liberal world order.
Trump’s tariff policies, the effects of the pandemic, China’s rule-breaking, and Russia’s aggressive behavior have made it impossible for the West to ignore geopolitics. The hope that globalization would tame power politics has given way to a more realist understanding: that states, even in a globalized world, act strategically based on power balances, vulnerabilities, and dependencies. For the West—and especially for Europe—this represents an epochal shift: from naïve faith in the market’s self-regulating forces to the realization that security, independence, and security of supply must once again be at the center of politics.
For Europe, Trump—with his unpredictability, prioritization of American interests, and tariff policies—is part of the problem or the new condition that requires geopolitical action. Yet it is also largely thanks to Trump that Europe has awakened to the necessity of geopolitics. It is difficult to see how the West could reduce its dependence on China without tariffs and increased state intervention.
In 2024, the EU adopted the Critical Raw Materials Act to reduce dependence on Chinese rare earth elements and other strategically important resources. The Union has also imposed extensive sanctions on Russia and applied a more geopolitical approach in its enlargement policy to counter Russian influence in neighboring countries. Furthermore, the EU Green Deal has been reformulated into a strategy for energy independence from authoritarian states, with increased investments in European production and supply security.
During Trump’s second term, the America First policy has intensified, with new tariffs against China and the EU aimed at protecting American industry. While tariff policy is not solely intended to reduce dependence and strengthen supply chains, the Trump administration has particularly prioritized reshoring semiconductor production and reducing dependence on China, while increasing federal investments in artificial intelligence, mining, and nuclear weapons development to strengthen the United States’ strategic position vis-à-vis its geopolitical rivals.
From Liberalism to Realism: Theories of International Relations
In terms of international relations theory, the shift from globalization and globalism to geopolitics and realpolitik corresponds to a move from liberalism to realism. In this context, liberalism refers to the belief that trade, international institutions, and mutual interdependence can create stability and reduce the risk of conflict. Realism, by contrast, assumes that the international order is fundamentally characterized by anarchy, in which states ultimately must safeguard their own security and power. Where liberalism sees interdependence as a path to peace, realism views it as a potential vulnerability—something the crises of recent years have clearly illustrated.
Liberalism in international relations theory can largely be traced back to Immanuel Kant, particularly his 1795 essay Perpetual Peace. Kant argued that lasting peace is possible if states are governed by republican constitutions, bound together through trade, and participate in common institutions that replace power politics with a legal order. These ideas form the foundation of the liberal belief that interdependence and international cooperation can create peace—a notion that long shaped the Western view of globalization.
Where liberalism represents optimism and idealism, realism stands for pessimism. Realism can be traced back to thinkers such as Thucydides, Niccolò Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes. In their works, the recurring idea is that politics is fundamentally about power, fear, and survival rather than morality or ideals. Thucydides described already in the Peloponnesian War how power determines relations between states; Machiavelli emphasized the logic of necessity and power; and Hobbes viewed the international order as a kind of state of nature without a higher authority.
Values-Based Realism
The theoretical distinction between liberalism and realism manifests itself in practical politics in how states handle power, security, and values. Where liberalism seeks cooperation through institutions and interdependence, realism assumes that stability is primarily achieved through strength and strategic balance. In reality, most states combine elements of both perspectives—something clearly illustrated by Nordic foreign policy, particularly in Finland’s case.
Realpolitik can be understood as the practical application of the theoretical school known in international relations as realism. While realism describes the world as a system without a higher authority, in which states primarily act based on self-interest and security, realpolitik entails pragmatic action that acknowledges these realities. In other words, realpolitik is the concrete political practice that follows from realism’s core assumption: that power and interests, rather than ideals, govern the international order.
Finland’s recent foreign policy, which Alexander Stubb has termed values-based realism, can be seen as a combination of liberalism and realism in which “values” form the foundation and specifically include democracy, human rights, the rule of law, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and respect for international law as embodied in the UN Charter. Realism here represents a pragmatic realpolitik that takes geopolitical realities into account. For Finland, realism itself is nothing new. The Paasikivi–Kekkonen line during the Cold War can be said to have been based on realpolitik or realism in a more general sense, but during the Cold War this realism largely manifested itself in neutrality and accommodation, whereas realism in today’s Finnish foreign policy instead revolves around alliance politics. In connection with the war in Ukraine, some realist political scientists—led by the American John Mearsheimer—have on the other hand advocated neutrality and accommodation for Russia’s neighboring countries. Mearsheimer’s offensive realism and his view of Russia as a great power that sees NATO expansion as an existential threat have likely, at least indirectly, influenced the Trump administration’s restrictive support for Ukraine.
The Moral Dilemma of Realism
Right-wing politicians are sometimes criticized for being cynical or unprincipled when they assume that the world is characterized by power, conflict, and asymmetric dependencies, and that politics requires tough strategic measures rather than blind trust in reciprocity. Building supply security, rearming militarily, and countering pressure from authoritarian powers can be perceived as harsh policies even when the aim is to defend and promote liberal values such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Realism and pessimism do not necessarily stand in opposition to liberal principles and values.
Globalization and the liberal world order have generally been more appealing to smaller states, which gain protection through treaties and international rules, whereas great powers have stronger incentives to favor geopolitics and a realist approach to international relations. Despite this, it has primarily been the United States that has upheld the rules-based, liberal order since the Second World War. The United Nations has played a central role in this system, not least as an arena for American influence. That the UN today appears paralyzed is partly due to the fact that Russia and China are permanent members with veto power in the Security Council, and partly because the United States’ relative influence over the organization has declined as global power relations have shifted. Paradoxically, the United States and its allies must act geopolitically in order to defend the liberal, rules-based world order. It is a challenging and risky—but necessary—balancing act.